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INTRODUCTION 
There is no dearth of commentary about the doctrine of equiva-
lents in patent law. 1 Many articles proclaim the doctrine's death, 
often noting its passage with unbridled delight. 2 Some articles pro-
vide empirical evidence to support the assertion that the doctrine of 
equivalents is dead. 3 Others simply yearn for the doctrine to fade 
1 For just a few of the many possible examples, see Timothy R. Holbrook, Equiva-
lency and Patent Law's Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2009); Michael J. 
Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement, and Patent Claim Scope: A New 
Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947 (2005); Nicholas Pumfrey et 
a!., I1w Doctrine of Equivalents in Various Patent Regimes- Does Anybody Have it Right?, 
11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 261 (2008); Harold C. Wegner et a!., The Future of the Doctrine of 
Equivalents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 277 (1998). 
2 See, e.g., Charles W. Adams, TIJe Doctrine of Equivalents: Becoming a Derelict on the 
Waters of Patent Law, 84 NEB. L. REV. 1113, 1113 (2006); John R. Allison & Mark A. 
Lemley, I1w (Unnoticed) Demise of tlze Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 958 
(2007); Lee Petherbridge, On the Decline of t/ze Doctrine of Equivalents, 31 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1371,1404 (2010). 
The doctrine's demise has also been heralded by non-academic law media. See, 
e.g., Eugene R. Quinn, A Slow Death? Killing the Doctrine of Equivalents, 164 PAT. 
WORLD 50, 50 (2004), available at http:/ /ipwatchdog.com/articles/ Aug-04-
Closing.pdf; Victoria Slind-Flor, Doctrine of Equivalents Receives Death Blow in Federal 
Circuit, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 14, 2000, at 5 (noting that "the doctrine of equivalents is now 
either dead or terminally ill"). 
3 See, e.g., Allison & Lemley, supra note 2. 
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from use, pointing out that no court has "articulated a convincing 
rationale" for the doctrine's continued use. 4 But maybe these scho-
lars have it wrong. It may be true that the instances of doctrine of 
equivalents analysis in patent cases are on the decline and success-
ful outcomes based on the doctrine waning further. But these ob-
servations tell only a small part of the story. This Article contends 
that, despite evidence to the contrary, the death of the doctrine of 
equivalents has been greatly exaggerated. 5 
The birth of the doctrine of equivalents was noble enough; it 
was created to soften the blow associated with literal interpretation 
of patent claim terms. During patent litigation, claims of the patent 
are generally construed as lists of necessary and sufficient features 
or conditions. During infringement analysis, if each and every 
claimed feature or condition is found in the accused device or 
process, infringement is found. Infringement, then, can be viewed 
like traditional set theory, where an object is deemed a member of a 
class if it meets the required attributes of the class. 6 The discontent 
with this system comes when the accused device or process does 
not squarely satisfy each of the features or conditions of the claim, 
yet is essentially the same as the patented invention. Courts have 
4 See Adams, supra note 2, at 1116; Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of 
Equivalents and Claiming the Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.l157 (2004). 
At least one commentator, however, rues the demise of the doctrine of equiva-
lents. See John F. Duffy, George Wash. Univ. Law School, Thirteenth Annual Honor-
able Helen Wilson Nies Memorial Lecture in Intellectual Property Law: Innovation 
and Recovery (Oct. 21, 2009), in 14 MARQ. lNTELL. PROP. L. REV. 237, 256 (2010) ("The 
demise of the doctrine of equivalents is a shame .... "). 
s With apologies to Mark Twain, who remarked, "The report of my death was an 
exaggeration." MARK TWAIN: THE COMPLETE INTERVIEWS 317 (Gary Scharnhorst ed., 
2006). 
6 See, e.g., ChangingMinds.org, Set Theory, 
http:// changingminds.org/ disciplines/ argument/ syllogisms/ set_ theory .htrn (last 
visited March 31, 2011) ("In set theory, we say A is a member of B .... This means 
that A has all the attributes of B, that A is a B in all respects."). 
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been loath to excuse infringers who take the essence, if not the exact 
parameters, of the patented invention, whether intentionally or 
not. 7 The doctrine of equivalents was thus crafted to permit a find-
ing of infringement, even where the accused device or process does 
not literally infringe the claim and to prevent an infringer from 
avoiding liability by making trivial changes. 8 
The aspirations of the doctrine, however, reach farther. Effec-
tive application of the doctrine eases the difficulty of describing and 
defining the boundaries of new inventions using words. 9 The doc-
trine moderates the differences between what the inventor in-
vented, what the patent claims, and what of the invention could 
reasonably be described in the words of the claim. 10 But if the doc-
trine of equivalents is dead, as many contend, where does that leave 
us? 
7 Patent infringement lies whether the alleged infringer has copied the device or 
process from the patent directly, independently invents the device or process, or 
knowing of the patent, attempts to make his invention different enough from the 
patented invention to escape liability. Although one of the justifications for the doc-
trine of equivalents is to prevent "unscrupulous copyists," the allegation of outright 
copying is rare. See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Frontiers in Empirical 
Patent Law Scholarship: Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1423-24 (2009). 
8 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chern. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997); Fes-
ta Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733 (2002). 
9 "Th[e] conversion of machine to words allows for unintended gaps which can-
not be satisfactorily filled. Often the invention is novel and words do not exist to 
describe it. The dictionary does not always keep abreast of the inventor. It cannot. 
Things are not made for the sake of words, but words for things." 
Autogiro Co. of Am. v. U.S., 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967). See Festa, 535 U.S. at 
731 ("Unfortunately, the nature of language makes it impossible to capture the es-
sence of a thing in a patent application."). 
1o See Kenneth D. Bassinger, Allocating Linguistic Uncertainty in Patent Claims: The 
Proper Role of Prosecution History Estoppel, 49 LOY. L. REV. 339, 340 (2003) ("The subtle 
nuances of inventive genius are not readily described by the often strict confines 
imposed by language."); Festa, 535 U.S. at 733 ("The doctrine of equivalents allows 
the patentee to claim those insubstantial alterations that were not captured in draft-
ing the original patent claim but which could be created through trivial changes."). 
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Although language and its usage expand every day to allow for 
discussions of new ideas and technology, it still remains difficult, if 
not impossible, to describe any new invention in words. In short, 
the problems that gave rise to the doctrine are as present today as 
ever. If the problem remains, then perhaps the erstwhile solution 
provided by the doctrine of equivalents is also still vibrant. Despite 
the arguments and evidence that the doctrine is dead, the truth is 
more likely that the work previously done by the doctrine is now 
being performed at a different stage of the infringement analysis, 
and for good reason. Rather than requiring a specialized (and much 
derided) doctrine to soften the blow of literally interpreting lan-
guage, this activity is more naturally performed at the time of con-
struction and infringement determination. In fact, as humans, this is 
our intuition. 
Cognitive linguistics is the study of how humans naturally 
think about and understand language. Some of this understanding 
comes from the mental creation of categories, organized around 
what is thought to be the "best" example of the category, i.e., the 
prototype. 11 When new objects or experiences are encountered, they 
are not placed into mental categories based on a list of necessary 
and sufficient conditions, as is done in traditional set theory. Rather, 
cognitive linguistics has been described as a type of fuzzy set 
theory. When encountering something new, the natural tendency is 
to categorize the new object or experience based on the extent to 
which it resembles the prototype of the category in question versus 
the extent to which it resembles other prototypes and categories. 
The new object or experience may be categorized even if it lacks one 
or more of the characteristics of the prototype. An object or expe-
rience can be a "good" member of the category if it closely resem-
11 See Laura A. Janda, Cognitive Linguistics 13-15 (2006), 
http:// ssrn.corn/ abstract=1408069. 
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bles the prototype, but a "lesser" member of the category if the re-
semblance is not so much. Thus cognitive linguistics allows for a 
kind of fuzzy definition of categories and members. 
For a simple example, consider the category bird. 12 One way to 
define bird would be to develop a list of features that a bird must 
have, such as wings, feathers, and the ability to fly. 13 Many com-
mon birds, such as robins, wrens, sparrows, and cardinals, would 
fulfill all these criteria and be classified as birds. There are other 
animals that are birds that would not meet the given requirements; 
penguins do not fly or have regular feathers. Under usual set 
theory, the penguin is not a bird because it does not fulfill the ne-
cessary and sufficient criteria to be within bird. If instead we define 
bird as we do in cognitive linguistics, we may identify a particular 
bird, such as a robin, to be the prototype of the category bird. All 
other animals would then be compared to the prototypical robin to 
determine the extent of resemblance, and thus the level of member-
ship in the category. Wrens, sparrows, and cardinals are easily clas-
sified as bird because the level of resemblance to a robin is quite 
high. Penguins, however, differ significantly from robins. Yet, in 
comparing the penguin to prototypes for other categories, such as 
the terrier for dog and the tabby for cat, it becomes clear that the 
penguin is most similar to, and thus is considered a member of, 
bird. 
Returning to patent law- what if instead we interpret claims 
and determine infringement as is done in regular speech, using pro-
12 As a matter of convention, a given category will be indicated by bold text to dis-
tinguish it from a singular instance of the same. 
13 The bird example given in this paragraph is drawn from work done by Eleanor 
Rosch, who is considered among the founders of the cognitive linguistics and proto-
type theory. See, e.g., Eleanor Rosch, Principles of Categorization, in COGNITION AND 
CATEGORIZATION 27 (Eleanor Rosch & Barbara B. Lloyd eds., 1978). See also infra 
Section IIA . 
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totypes and categories? As an everyday matter, we already know 
how to soften the blow of literally interpreting language. By view-
ing the claim as construed as the prototypical member of the cate-
gory claim, then an allegedly infringing device or process can be 
compared to the construed claim language to determine if it bears 
sufficient resemblance to the prototype to be categorized as such. If 
so, the accused device or process becomes a reasonably strong 
member of claim, and thus infringes. In this light, the decline in the 
application in the doctrine of equivalents may simply signal that the 
old, set theory-based infringement analysis has given way to the 
prototype categorization method. To wit-the doctrine of equiva-
lents is not truly dead, because a penguin is still a bird. 
This Article, in Part I, describes the life and alleged death of the 
doctrine of equivalents, including where the doctrine of equivalents 
comes from and why so many commentators presume or pray for it 
to be moribund. Part II explicates in more detail the notions from 
cognitive linguistics discussed above, specifically categories, proto-
types, and members. Part III of this Article connects these two dis-
parate discussions and explains why cognitive linguistics demon-
strates that the underlying notions behind the doctrine of equiva-
lents are present in everyday human understanding of language. 
Regardless of when and where it is done, how people understand 
and think about language can simply not be divorced from patent 
law. This Article concludes that the heart and soul of the doctrine of 
equivalents is still very much alive. 
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I. THE FUZZY LIFE OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS 
[T]he doctrine of equivalents ... relieve[s] an inventor from a seman-
tic strait jacket when equity requires .. . 
--Chief Judge Howard Markey, Federal Circuit 14 
A patent infringement lawsuit generally involves construing 
the asserted claims of a patent and comparing the claims as con-
strued to an allegedly infringing device or process. 15 Ideally, claims 
are construed early in patent litigation, as the interpretations often 
decide, or at least significantly direct the outcome of, the case. 16 
During claim construction, each party typically offers its own defi-
nitions; the plaintiff proffers an interpretation of disputed terms 
that will result in a likely finding of infringement, the defendant 
submits definitions that will prohibit a finding of infringement and 
may also affect the invalidity of the patent. The judge then defines 
the terms, giving boundaries to the scope of the patent claims; basi-
cally, the judge constructs a fence around the patentee's exclusive 
territory. 17 
The jury, or judge in a bench trial, then determines whether the 
alleged infringing device or process fits within the bounds of the 
14 Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532-33 (Fed. 
Cir. 1987). 
15 An additional step of analyzing any defenses asserted, such as invalidity or ine-
quitable conduct, may also occur. While outside the scope of this paper, this step too 
revolves around the understanding of patent claims. See, e.g., Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. 
United States, 147 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
16 See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (en bane) (Mayer,)., concurring) ("[T]o decide what the claims mean is nearly 
always to decide the case."), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
17 See Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and tlze Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J. 
759, 759 (1999) ("Patent law is about building fences."). But see Dan L. Burk & Mark 
A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1743, 1799 (2009) (concluding that patent law would benefit from thinking of 
claim construction in terms of sign posts rather than fence posts). 
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claims as construed. 18 Literal infringement is found if every element 
or limitation of the construed claim is present in the accused device 
or process- in other words, the necessary and sufficient conditions 
are met or the accused device or process falls within the defined 
fence. 19 Where the accused device or process does not fall squarely 
within the boundaries of the asserted claim as construed, liability 
for infringement may still be found under the doctrine of equiva-
lents. 20 The doctrine essentially creates, outside of the fence, a rela-
tively narrow fuzzy area in which the alleged infringer may still be 
held liable. The doctrine's main justification is fairness-patent pro-
tection would be "hollow and useless" if a competitor can avoid an 
infringement finding by including a trivial difference that would 
move the infringer from within to just without the fence con-
structed by the judge. 21 
But in creating this fuzzy area outside the border of the patent 
claims, however beneficial to the patentee, the doctrine defeats, or 
at least diminishes, the public notice function performed by patent 
claims. 22 Patent claims should provide information about what sub-
ject matter is open for public use and experimentation, as well as 
what is not available for use without infringement. 23 Given the in-
dividual importance of each of these two competing interests-
fairly maintaining patent value versus fulfilling the public notice 
1s See, e.g., Bai v. L & L Wings, Inc., 160 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
19 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chern. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28 (1997). 
2o See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 727 
(2002) ("(A] patent protects its holder against efforts of copyists to evade liability for 
infringement by making only insubstantial changes to a patented invention."). 
21 See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,607 (1950). 
22 See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29. 
23 See, e.g., Athletic Alternatives v. Prince Mfg., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996); 
Burk & Lemley, supra note 17, at 1791 ("The ostensible purpose of [patent claims 
include] placing the public on notice as to the limits of the patent, warning the public 
away from the claimed technology, and demarcating the boundary between infring-
ing and non-infringing activity."). 
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function- it is not surprising that the doctrine of equivalents has 
lived a much storied life. The doctrine has received extensive treat-
ment by the Supreme Court, spanning over a century and a half, 
and even more analysis at the hands of the Federal Circuit since its 
inception in 1982. 24 A brief look at the Court's treatment of the doc-
ument demonstrates the difficulties in balancing fairness with no-
tice. 
A. IN THE BEGINNING 
Early in the United States patent system, patent scope was de-
termined not via claims, but by the patent document as a whole, in 
a practice known as central claiming. 25 Particularly, the patentee's 
exclusive territory included the embodiments described in the full 
description and drawings of the patent. 26 In 1854, the Supreme 
24 Supreme Court treatment ranges from 1854 in Winans v. Demead, 56 U.S. (15 
How.) 330, 334-36 (1854), to 2002, in Festa, 535 U.S. 722. In the mere 28 years the Fed-
eral Circuit has been in existence, it has heard some 577 cases about the doctrine of 
equivalents, measured by searching all cases of the Federal Circuit that mention the 
doctrine of equivalents at least 5 times. LexisNexis, http:/ jwww.lexisnexis.com (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2011) (search performed by searching for "at! 5 (doctrine of equiva-
lents)" after following the "Federal Legal- U.S." hyperlink, then "Find Cases," then 
"Federal Courts by Circuit," then "Federal Cases by Circuit," then "Federal Circuit-
US Court of Appeals Cases"). The earliest case discovered by the search was SSIH 
Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365 (Fed. Cir. 1983); the most recent 
case is Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 2011 
US App. LEXlS 3546 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 24, 2011). 
25 See Adams, supra note 2, at 1117; Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Pa-
tents, 20 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 134, 135-37 (1938). 
26Hilton Davis Chern. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1565-66 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis 
Chern. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
"The majority in Winans endorsed central claiming, subordinating the 
claim to the fuller description and the drawings of the invention contained 
in other parts of the patent .... It continued to be left to the courts to sift 
through the entirety of the patent description to determine what were the 
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Court recognized a significant limitation of the central claiming sys-
tem, namely that the patent's scope was constrained to only the 
embodiments depicted. But to limit the scope to only the embodi-
ments described was unfair; to expect the patentee to illustrate 
every possible modification and option was impractical. 27 The Su-
preme Court addressed this shortfall in the case of Winans v. De-
mead. 28 In this case, the patent taught a train car with a circular bot-
tom to better distribute the weight of the load; the alleged infringer 
made similar train cars that were octagonal rather than circular. 29 
The Court reversed the trial court's holding of no infringement, re-
manding the case to determine if the octagonal shape was "so near 
to a true circle as substantially to embody the patentee's mode of 
operation, and thereby attain the same kind of result as was reached 
by his invention." 30 
Central claiming gave way to peripheral claiming in the Patent 
Act of 1870.31 This made mandatory the inclusion of claims at the 
end of the patent document and set forth the claims as the boun-
dary of the exclusive territory granted by the patent. 32 In many re-
spects the peripheral claiming system was a positive change. First, 
the patentee was able to more clearly delineate the metes and 
bounds of his invention, rather than having to rest on what the 
material elements embodying the 'principle' or 'essence' of the invention .. 
" 
27 Winans, 56 U.S. at 343-44. 
28 See id. 
29 See id. at 331-32. 
30 See id. at 344. 
31 See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1566 ("The amendment of the patent statute by the 
Act of 1870, while a small language change, was interpreted to effect a major change 
from central to peripheral claiming, or at least a modified form of peripheral claim-
ing."). 
32 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) ("The specification shall conclude with one or more 
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the 
applicant regards as his invention."). 
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court believed to be inventive. 33 Second, the patentee could realisti-
cally provide a number of potential embodiments without creating 
an unwieldy patent document, as would have been required under 
the central claiming system. Specifically, rather than having to fully 
describe each potential embodiment that the inventor wished to 
cover in the patent specification, he could more broadly describe a 
"preferred" embodiment and then use multiple claims to signal var-
iations on that preferred embodiment. 34 Both of these changes 
should have diminished the need for the doctrine of equivalents. 
Nearly a century passed before the Supreme Court next spoke 
on the doctrine of equivalents. In 1950, the Court affirmed the via-
bility of the doctrine in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air 
Products Co. Again, focusing on fairness, the Court reasoned that the 
doctrine was necessary to prevent competitors from making insigni-
ficant changes to a patented invention without liability, thereby de-
valuing the patent. 35 After the Court affirmed the doctrine of equi-
33 See Adams, supra note 2, at 1119. 
34 Robert H. Resis, Reducing the Need for Markman Determinations, 4 J. MARSHALL 
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 53, 55 (2004). 
"The Federal Circuit also has held that the claims are not limited to the 
preferred embodiment(s) disclosed in the detailed description. To avoid 
being limited to what they specifically disclose, patent applicants can 
simply draft dependent claims that are broader than their preferred embo-
diment(s). Regardless, patent applicants are presumably not limited to the 
preferred embodiment(s)." 
However, the claims cannot extend well beyond the scope of the written description. 
See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
("[T]he scope of the claims must bear a reasonable correlation to the scope of 
enablement provided by the specification to persons of ordinary skill in the art."); 
O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1854) ("[H]e claims an exclusive right to 
use a manner and process which he has not described and indeed had not invented, 
and therefore could not describe when he obtained his patent. The court is of the 
opinion that the claim is too broad, and not warranted by law."). 
35 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-08 (1950). 
The flip side of protecting the patentee, as noted in dissent, is that the use of the doc-
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valents in Graver Tank, it seemed as though the doctrine would flou-
rish-and it did. Not until some forty-seven years after Graver Tank 
did the Supreme Court take up the doctrine of equivalents yet 
again, this time to rein it in just a bit. In Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hil-
ton Davis Chemical Co., the Court reaffirmed the doctrine of equiva-
lents, but balanced the doctrine with what is now known as "all 
elements rule." 36 This limitation on the doctrine was added to sal-
vage some sort of public notice of the scope of patent protection. 
The Supreme Court also discussed the rule of prosecution history 
estoppel, a previously-recognized limitation on the doctrine of 
equivalents that also addressed public notice. 37 
Even after Warner-Jenkinson, the doctrine of equivalents would 
have seemed to have a fairly robust life. The Federal Circuit, how-
ever, found the all-elements and the prosecution history estoppel 
rules difficult to apply; to make things easier, the court imposed an 
absolute bar in cases of prosecution history estoppel. 38 If a claim 
trine of equivalents imposes the great cost of uncertainty of claim scope. See id. at 617 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
36 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chern. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997). The 
"all elements" rule requires that the doctrine of equivalents is to be performed on an 
element-by-element basis. See id. 
37 See id. at 30. See also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 33 (1966) (noting that 
"claims that have been narrowed [during prosecution] in order to obtain the issuance 
of a patent by distinguishing the prior art cannot be sustained to cover that which 
was previously by limitation eliminated from the patent."). Prosecution history es-
toppel is also called file wrapper estoppel in earlier cases. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 
U.S. at 30. 
38 It is not too surprising that the Federal Circuit went in this direction post-
Warner-Jenkinson. In the case's first trip to the Federal Circuit from the trial court, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court's finding of infringement under the doctrine 
of equivalents. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1528-
29 (1995). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Federal Circuit's opi-
nion, and remanded the case in light of its new decision. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. 
Hilton Davis Chern. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40-41 (1997). On remand, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the infringement finding with respect to one of the two patents at issue, but 
remanded for the trial court to determine prosecution history estoppel with respect 
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was subject to a narrowing amendment during prosecution, the 
doctrine of equivalents was wholly unavailable to the patentee. In-
stead, the patent would be limited to its literal scope, improving 
public notice. And this bright line rule signaled what many as-
sumed was the doctrine's death march. 
B. AND THEN THE "END" 
In 2002, the Supreme Court weighed in on the doctrine of equi-
valents, and particularly the Federal Circuit's bright line rule, in the 
case of Festa Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. 39 The 
Court held that the complete bar imposed by the Federal Circuit 
was inconsistent with both the rationale for the doctrine (the ability 
to avoid infringement by making a trivial modification) as well as 
the reason for the prosecution history estoppel limitation (preserv-
ing public notice).40 
The Festa Court hinged its opinion on the difficulties of lan-
guage- namely the inability to perfectly describe an invention in 
words; the doctrine prevents the patentee from being unfairly li-
mited by his words. 41 However, the test ultimately set forth in the 
to the second patent. Hilton Davis Chern. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 114 F.3d 
1161, 1162-63 (1997). 
39 Festa Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
40 I d. at 737-38. 
41 /d. at 738. 
"It does not follow, however, that the amended claim becomes so perfect 
in its description that no one could devise an equivalent. After amend-
ment, as before, language remains an imperfect fit for invention. The nar-
rowing amendment may demonstrate what the claim is not; but it may still 
fail to capture precisely what is." 
See Adams, supra note 2, at 1151-52 (noting that the exceptions to prosecution his-
tory estoppel are based on whether at the time of amendment one skilled in the art 
could reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally en-
compassed the alleged equivalent). 
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case has little to do with language or preserving patent value. Festo 
provides a list of three circumstances that would permit a patentee 
to seek infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, even if a 
narrowing amendment had been made to that claim: 42 that the 
equivalent was unforeseeable at the time of amendment, that the 
reason for amendment bears only tangential relation to the equiva-
lent in question, or that there may be some other reason, such as the 
limitations of language, that the patentee could not reasonably be 
expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in ques-
tion. 43 The one rebuttal that may actually be related to the problem 
being solved-the inadequacy of language-is the one that is most 
circumspect. 44 In any case, all three circumstances are to be inter-
preted narrowly. 45 In the end, it seems that public notice prevailed 
over fairness. 
Although many scholars point to Festo as sounding the doctrine 
of equivalents' purported death knell, others argue that the doctrine 
of equivalents died when the Markman opinion was issued in 1996. 
In Markman, the Supreme Court took the task of claim construction 
from the jury and rested interpretation power solely with the 
judge.46 Theoretically, the doctrine of equivalents and the bases for 
Markman are at odds. The purpose of Markman was to improve 
claim construction, because uniform claim constructions and cer-
42 See Festa, 535 U.S. at 740-41. 
43 Id. at 740-41. 
44 The Federal Circuit did note on remand that "the third criterion may be satisfied when 
there was some reason, such as the shortcomings of language, why the patentee was pre-
vented from describing the alleged equivalent when it narrowed the claim." Festo Corp. v. 
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en 
bane). 
45 See id. (noting that "some other reason" must be construed narrowly); id. at 1377 
(Rader, J., concurring) (limiting the foreseeability criterion to after-arising technolo-
gies); Cross Med. Prods. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 480 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007) (reaffirming that the tangential rebuttal must be applied narrowly). 
46 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996). 
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tainty of claim scope would better serve the public notice func-
tion. 47 The doctrine of equivalents, on the other hand, realizes that 
uniform claim constructions may result in unfairness and purpose-
fully makes the claim scope inconsistent or fuzzy. 48 
In addition to theoretical tension, there is a procedural basis for 
blaming Markman for the decline of the doctrine of equivalents. Be-
fore Markman, patent infringement cases proceeded generally in one 
step, as a jury would construe the claims as part of the overall in-
fringement determination. After Markman, patent infringement cas-
es were split into two prongs, the judge's claim construction and the 
jury's determination of infringement based on the claims as con-
strued. Often, the claim construction rendered by the judge proves 
to be dispositive on the question of literal infringement. 49 Infringe-
ment under the doctrine of equivalents still lingers, however, as the 
question of whether an element in the accused device or process is 
equivalent to the claimed element is a question of fact. Therefore, 
the judge has incentive to find non-infringement under the doctrine 
of equivalents on summary judgment to get the patent case off his 
docket. 50 Parties generally welcome this, because an opinion that 
addresses both literal infringement and infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents is ripe for appeal to the Federal Circuit. The 
decline in successful doctrine of equivalents cases may very well be 
47 See id. at 390. 
48 John R. Thomas, Claim Re-Construction: Tile DOE in tile Post-Markman Era, 9 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 153, 155-56 (2005). 
49 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967,989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en 
bane) (Mayer, J., concurring) ("[T]o decide what the claims mean is nearly always to 
decide the case."), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996); id. at 999 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("De-
ciding the meaning of the words used in the patent is often dispositive of the ques-
tion of infringement."). 
50 See Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 977; Petherbridge, supra note 2, at 1377. 
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a sign of a general judicial desire to avoid lengthy and complex pa-
tent trials. 51 
From this discussion, it is easy to see why the many commenta-
tors assume the doctrine of equivalents is dying, if not already 
dead. Certainly the doctrine's appearance and its successful use 
seem to be on the downturn. However, a bit of life lurks beneath the 
surface. This is where the idea of cognitive linguistics proves in-
sightful. 
II. COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS - THE Fuzzy EDGES OF WORDS 
Language is the source of misunderstandings. 
- Antoine de Saint-Exupery52 
Linguistics is simply the study of language.s3 Traditional lin-
guistics begins with the pieces of language and examines how they 
are put together for communication. For example, sounds (pho-
nemes) are joined to make words that serve as basic building blocks 
(morphemes), to which we can add prefixes and suffixes to create 
additional words. 54 All of these words have meanings (semantics).ss 
The words are combined based on a grammar, or set of rules, to 
form a sentence or complete idea (syntax).S6 Finally, a group of 
51 See Peter J. Ayers, Armed and Ready: Defeating Patent Infringement Claims by 
Summary Judgment, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 421, 448 (1999) (noting that 
filing for summary judgment on infringement issues after claim construction will 
result in avoiding an entire trial, at best, or having the case remanded for trial, at 
worst). 
52 See ANTOINE DE 5AINT-EXUPERY, THE LITTLE PRINCE 60 (Richard Howard trans., 
South China Printing 2000) (1943). 
53 See Peter M. Tiersma, The Judge as Linguist, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 269,269 (1993). 
54 See, e.g., Jiri Janko, Note, Linguistically Integrated Contractual Interpretation: Incor-
porating Semiotic Theory of Meaning-Making into Legal Interpretation, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 
601,613-17 (2007). 
55 See id. 
56 See id. 
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ideas or sentences, when considered in context, can acquire addi-
tional meaning (pragmatics). 57 
Cognitive linguistics takes a different approach, starting with a 
conversation as a whole and breaking it down based on the func-
tion and use of language. Rather than viewing language as a com-
bination of little bits of sounds and words, as is the case in tradi-
tional linguistics, cognitive linguistics view language as a reflection 
of the human mind.ss In this way, understanding language can tell 
us interesting things about how human beings see and comprehend 
the world. 
For the purposes of this paper, and perhaps for understanding 
language in any case, the focus must be the set of words that hu-
mans use to perceive, appreciate, and discuss their world.59 Know-
ledge of language, or more precisely the creation of vocabulary, 
comes generally from use. Consider how children acquire their first 
language. The initial words learned are those used for labeling-
that is, mapping a word to a concept, such as dog or mama. But the 
child then learns that all animals are not dogs and all caregivers or 
women are not mama. The child then has to learn how far to extend 
the labeled concept and by what measure things fit within or with-
out the concept. 60 Language acquisition thus extends from labeling 
to categorization, a key feature of cognitive linguistics. 61 
57 See id. 
58 See, e.g., Carl 5. Bjerre, Secured Transactions Inside Out: Negative Pledge Covenants, 
Property and Perfection, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 355 (1999). 
59 See, e.g., DAVID A. WILKINS, LINGUISTICS IN LANGUAGE TEACHING 111 (Hodder 
Arnold 1974) (1972) ("[W]ithout grammar very little can be conveyed, without voca-
bulary nothing can be conveyed.") (emphasis omitted). 
60 Yanqing Chen, A Cognitive Linguistic Approach to Classroom Englis/1 Vocabulary 
Instruction for EFL Learners in Mainland China, 2 ENG. LANGUAGE TEACHING 95, 95 
(2009) ("[C]ognitive linguistics is an approach that is 'based on our experience in the 
world and the way we perceive and conceptualize it,' an approach to the analysis of 
natural language that focuses on language as an instrument for organizing, 
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A. PROTOTYPE SEMANTICS 
When encountering a word or situation for the first time, it is 
natural for us to determine how the new word or situation relates to 
words and situations we have encountered before. Perhaps it fits 
within one or more existing categories created from other encoun-
ters; perhaps it calls for the definition of the new category, distin-
guished from the existing categories. In short, meaning comes from 
experiences, experiences are stored in categories, and future expe-
riences will be stored via inclusion in and relationships to existing 
categories.62 Categorization approximates how we, as humans, ex-
perience the world and how we conceptualize and process our ex-
periences. 
Traditionally, categorization calls to mind set theory. Each cate-
gory is a set, and the set is defined by a list of necessary and suffi-
cient conditions.63 An object that satisfies the list of conditions is a 
member of the set, or category.64 An object that does not satisfy the 
entire list is not. Whether an object satisfies any one criterion is a 
binary question, as is membership in the set.65 But this does not 
align with how we intuitively think about language. Human beings 
do not encounter new experiences armed with a list of conjunctive 
criteria to be established. 66 Further, objects we encounter in the 
processing, and conveying information . . . .") (citation omitted), available at 
http://www .ccsenet.org/ journal/ index. php/ elt/ article/ view /343/306. See also 
Janda, supra note 11, at 16 ("The urge to categorize is very strong, and it seems that in 
order to process, store, manipulate, and access information, human beings need to 
organize it in categories."). 
61 See Chen, supra note 60, at 96. 
62 See, e.g., WILLIAM CROFf & D. ALAN CRUSE, COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 74 (2004). 
63 Tom Cunningham, Categories versus Rules, 4 (1998) (unpublished student 
project), http:// meansandends.com/TomCunningham/ files/ categorisation. pdf. 
64 See id. 
65 See id. 
66 See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK}OHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 71 (1980). 
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world rarely meet binary criteria or fit perfectly within one catego-
ry. 67 It is this realization that gave rise to the idea of prototype se-
mantics. 
The idea that language is not defined by a set of strictly defined 
categories (as is the case in set theory) developed from the work of 
philosophers, linguists, and psychologists beginning in the mid-2Qth 
century. Wittgenstein noticed that, while classical category theory 
required clear boundaries based on common properties and binary 
membership, reality calls for fuzzy boundaries. 68 Rather than a list 
of necessary and sufficient conditions, categories are defined by 
family resemblances, with membership in the category being a mat-
ter of degree. 69 Others observed that words can become members of 
a category based on relationships to other words in the category, 
even in the absence of family resemblance.7° Labov demonstrated 
that, even if a set of subjects initially identified an object as belong-
ing to one category, a slight change in the object may result in any 
number of categories being identified by the same subjects. 71 
The true breakthrough in prototype semantics is generally at-
tributed to Eleanor Rosch, who greatly influenced cognitive linguis-
tics by developing the theory of prototypes and categorization. 72 
She showed that the subconscious human mind organizes all expe-
67 See id. 
68 See GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES 
REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 16-17 (1987). 
69 See id. 
7o See id. at 18-20. 
71 For example, all subjects uniformly identified a curved object having a handle 
and a certain height/width ratio as a "cup." However, when the ratio was altered 
slightly, the subjects returned a number of identifications, such as "cup," "mug," and 
"bowl." See Cunningham, supra note 63, at 5; William Labov, The Boundaries of Words 
and their Meanings, in Fuzzy GRAMMAR: A READER 67, 76-85 (Bas Aarts et al. eds., 
2004). 
n See Lakoff, supra note 68, at 39. 
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riences into categories. 73 Within these categories are hierarchies and 
between categories are relationships. 74 Each category has a proto-
typical member, a "best" representation of the category or a mem-
ber "par excellence." 75 Other members of the category are peripher-
al members. 76 All peripheral members bear some relationship to the 
prototypical member, but they may have varying degrees of simi-
larity, or unequal status, as members. 77 
The bird example discussed in the Introduction represents one 
of Rosch's best known studies. In a survey of university students, 
she first explained how members of a category could be better 
members or worse members of a category. 78 She then asked the 
students to rate over 50 members of a category on a scale of 1 to 7, 
based on how good a representative they considered the particular 
member to be for the given category. 79 In one study, the category 
was bird and she defined the category based on thirteen attributes 
that are common to birds: eggs, beak, wings, fly, cage, feathers, col-
ors, etc. 80 A robin shared the most attributes of these thirteen than 
did other members of bird and thus became the prototypical bird. 81 
Based on the students' responses, there was a big discrepancy be-
tween sparrows (very much like bird) and penguins (very unlike 
bird)-even though the list of 50-plus members contained only 
birds.82 
73 See id. 
74 See Janda, supra note 11, at 13-18. 
75 See id. 
76 See id. 
77 See id. 
78 See Cunningham, supra note 63, at 6-7; Eleanor Rosch, Cognitive Representations 
of Semantic Categories, 104 J. EXPERIMENTAL PsYCH.: GEN. 192,192-223 (1975). 
79 See Rosch, supra note 78, at 192-223. 
80 See id. 
81 See id. 
82 See id. 
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Recent linguistics research has further developed the field of 
prototype semantics. One example is the introduction of fuzziness. 
Linguists have determined that the boundaries between categories 
are fuzzy, or non-binary, as are the boundaries of criteria ascribed 
to any given category. 83 The degree of membership in any category 
is also fuzzy. x4 Additionally, the criteria associated with categories 
are not simply definitional, but instead represent high-level abstract 
conceptualization as well as important cultural beliefs. 85 
Fuzzy logic is a mathematical manifestation of the same idea. In 
fuzzy logic, binary results represent the end of a continuum and 
most observations fall somewhere along the scale. x6 The field of 
fuzzy logic is much more developed and complex than this, but the 
message is the same-the observable world does not work in abso-
lutes, but in varying degrees. 87 Although true as well in prototype 
semantics, the idea of weighted criteria may be easier to understand 
in terms of mathematical fuzzy logic. In addition to permitting sa-
tisfaction of membership criteria to various degrees, fuzzy logic also 
permits criteria of different importance. 88 For example, the criterion 
that a member of bird has feathers may be more important than the 
criterion of the ability to fly. Thus, a bird that has feathers and flies 
would be a good member of bird. All other criterion being equal, a 
bird that has feathers, but does not fly, may still be a reasonably 
strong member of bird. However, a bird that does not have feath-
ers, but does fly, would be a much lesser member of bird, even 
83 See Cunningham, supra note 63, at 9; JOHN R. TAYLOR, LiNGUISTIC 
CATEGORIZATION: PROTOTYPES IN LiNGUISTIC THEORY 38 (2d ed. 1995). 
84 See Taylor, supra note 83, at 51. 
8; See id. at 82-83. 
86 See, e.g., BART KOSKO, Fuzzy THINKING: THE NEW SCIENCE OF FUZZY LOGIC 18 
(1993); DANIEL MCNEILL & PAUL FREIBERGER, FUZZY LOGIC 12 (1993). 
87 See, e.g., MARTIN GARDNER, WEIRD WATER & Fuzzy LOGIC 158 (1996). 
88 See, e.g., R.E. Bellman & L.A. Zadeh, Decision-Making in a Fuzzy Environment, 17 
MGMT. Set. B141, Bl49-50 (1970). 
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though it too meets the other criteria, because the feather criteria 
was deemed more important. 
B. CONNECTIONS, HIERARCHIES, AND TAXONOMIES 
One of the benefits of thinking about language in terms of fuzzy 
categories is the ability to recognize relationships between various 
categories in a way that may not be possible with traditional sets. 
One relationship between categories is based on a taxonomic hie-
rarchy. 89 Superordinate categories are more broad, but related, cat-
egories; subordinate categories are more specific, but related, cate-
gories. 90 The basic level is the one at which category members have 
similarly perceived overall shapes. 91 Basic level categories are the 
first level understood by children and represent the most common-
ly used labels. 92 Moreover, it is the basic level at which our know-
ledge is organized. 93 A word commonly understood by a child 
learning to talk is the term dog. Later, the child will learn the supe-
rordinate animal, a category to which dog belongs, and subordi-
nates, such as retriever or poodle, which belong, among others, to 
the category dog. 94 In another example, if chair is the basic level 
word, a superordinate category may be furniture. Other members 
of furniture may be table and bed. Similarly, there may be subordi-
nate, peripheral members of chair, such as recliner and stool. The 
fuzzy boundaries of the categories allow for more inclusive subor-
dinate and superordinate memberships, resulting in a more com-
plete taxonomy. 
89 See, e.g., Croft & Cruse, supra note 62, at 96-97; Cognitive Linguistics, 
http:// cogling.wikia.corn/wiki/Levels_of_categorization (last visited Mar. 3, 2011). 
90 See Croft & Cruse, supra note 62, at 96-97. 
91 See id. 
92 See Janda, supra note 11, at 16. 
93 See id. 
94 See Lakoff, supra note 68, at 46. 
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There are also connections within categories. This permits 
chaining, such that there may be peripheral members that have no 
particular feature in common with the prototypical member. 95 The 
nearest members to each member in the category have similar fea-
tures, but the members at the ends of the spectrum may have noth-
ing in common. 96 
Another feature of categorization is that these categories are not 
pigeon holes, as they are in set theory. Rather, the categories may be 
interrelated and objects may be members, to varying extents, of 
multiple categories. Consider a fallen log- it can be considered to 
have a seat, because it can be sat upon. Having a seat is an impor-
tant attribute of the category chair. But certainly a log is not a very 
good member of chair because it does not include other characteris-
tics of chair, such as a back or 4 legs. A log may be a fairly good 
member of nature and a subordinate member of category tree, but 
it can also be a poor member of chair at the same time. This concept 
also allows for constructing a web of words that would be nearly 
opposites in set theory but instead may bear some level of relation, 
such as terms like black and white, or fingers and toes, or cops and 
robbers.97 Network building serves to link all the labels and catego-
ries that exist in our minds and lays the groundwork for a process 
that continues for as long as we are exposed to new words (and 
new meanings for old words) -that is, for the rest of our lives.9s 
Because these concepts and relationships seem a bit elementary, 
it may be tempting to deny the value of this aspect of prototype se-
mantics. Consider, however, the differences between acquiring lan-
guage and later learning a second language. Take a native English 
95 See Janda, supra note 11, at 13. 
%See id. 
97 See id. 
98 See id. 
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speaker who is learning to speak Spanish. The Spanish words will 
not be cemented in the subject's network, as are English words. In-
stead, the network building involved is most often a mapping of the 
second language onto the first, without creating categories or asso-
ciations between the Spanish words themselves. 99 Rather than 
learning dog in relation to external experiences, the subject learns 
that perro stands for dog. 100 In contrast, very young children exposed 
to parents speaking different languages (e.g., a mother speaks Eng-
lish to the child and a father speaks Spanish), the children learn 
both languages at a similar rate and exhibit no preference for either 
language. This is because the child is independently creating both 
language networks at the same time, rather than mapping a second 
language onto a primary network. 
C. CATEGORIZATION IN ACTION 
To truly see the benefit of prototype semantics, a more detailed 
illustration is helpful. Recall that traditional interpretation is defini-
tional; a word is defined by a set of features or rule-like properties 
that are binary, necessary, and sufficient conditions. 101 Under a de-
finitional view, we might determine that a member of set chair in-
cludes a seat, four legs, and a back, where the back is connected to 
one side of the seat and the four legs are connected to the other side 
of the seat. 102 Under traditional definitional interpretation (similar 
99 See Lakoff, supra note 68, at 97. 
100 See id. 
101 See Andrew Auchincloss Lundgren, Perspectives on Patent Claim Construction: 
Re-examining Markman v. Westview Instruments Through Linguistic and Cognitive 
Theories of Decisionmaking, 12 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 173, 207-08 (2004); Linda 
Coleman & Paul Kay, Prototype Semantics: The English Word Lie, 57 LANGUAGE 26, 26-
27 (1981). 
102 Chair Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http:/ jwww.merriarn-
webster.com/ dictionary/ chair (defining "chair" as "a seat typically having four legs 
and a back for one person") (last visited Sept. 22, 2011). 
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to set theory), if a newly encountered object does not meet all of 
these criteria, it is not a chair. But we can think of all sorts of chairs 
that cannot be members of category chair as defined. Imagine a 
stool (often no back, often having only 3 legs), a fancy Swedish 
chair that has a base rather than legs (no legs), or even a bean bag 
(no distinct seat, legs, or back). Perhaps you could make the argu-
ment that none of these examples are really chairs. And yet, if a 
guest to your house asked for a chair, you might reasonably direct 
them to any one of these objects, at least in a pinch. Similarly, we 
can think of things that do meet the criteria for chair, but that we 
would be unlikely to provide when asked for a chair, such as a sofa 
(having a seat, four legs, and a back, where the back is connected to 
one side of the seat and the legs are connected to the other). Even 
more extreme, a bed with a headboard could conceivably meet the 
criteria to fit in the category chair. The problem is that membership 
in the set chair is binary. Under set theory, there is no possibility of 
"almost a chair" for a 3-legged stool or "like a chair but different" 
for a sofa. 103 
To illustrate how prototype semantics would work differently, 
consider a particular construct that has been used for experiments 
in this area. First a schema, or a list of properties associated with the 
category, is created. 104 In traditional set theory, these properties are 
binary or dichotomous; in prototype semantics, the properties may 
be binary or may be fuzzy, allowing for multiple levels on which 
the property is met. 105 Membership in the category is fuzzy in much 
103 A reasonable objection would be to use more or less precision when defining 
the conditions that define chair. However, if you make the definition more lax, more 
false "positives" will occur; if you tighten up the definition, more false "negatives" 
will occur. Even putting those risks aside, it is impractical to draft a list of perfect 
conditions for any and every particular human encounter. 
1lll See Coleman & Kay, supra note 101, at 27. 
105 See id. 
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the same way. 106 Rather than a dichotomous category set (member 
or not member), category membership in prototype semantics is 
represented as a gradient, where the levels satisfaction of properties 
goes towards degree of membership, but the properties may carry 
different weights. 107 Taken together, the more prototype properties 
an object includes (and at a higher level of gradient and/ or carrying 
a greater weight), the higher the object will score-that is, the more 
or better of a member of the category set forth by the schema. 108 
Returning to the category chair, we can use the terms that were 
necessary and sufficient under traditional set theory (seat, 4 legs, 
back, and the connections between) as the schema. But now, we can 
more accurately represent our real-life experiences with various 
types of chairs by permitting non-binary satisfaction of criteria. For 
instance, the stool would satisfy the seat criteria fully, but would 
only meet the 4-legs property to some extent. Taken together, the 
criteria satisfied by the 3-legged stool would be less than a given 
chair that would fit in the category chair when defined in set 
theory, because that chair necessarily would include all of the crite-
ria perfectly. The difference is that under prototype semantics, the 
3-legged stool would still likely rise to a gradient level that would 
include it in chair, albeit at some lower level of membership. Addi-
tionally, it may be more important for a chair to have a back than to 
have 4 legs, so that a 3-legged seat with a back would be a better 
member of chair than a 3-legged seat without a back, but a 3-legged 
seat with a back would be nearly as good a member of chair as a 4-
legged seat with a back. Similar inferences can be drawn so that the 
category chair may include the chairs that were previously ex-
cluded in traditional set theory, i.e., the Swedish design chairs (no 
106 See id. 
107 See id. 
108 See id. 
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legs, but seat and backs), ergonomic chairs (legs but no back), and 
even bean bags (no legs, no backs). 
The inclusion of a bean bag in category chair raises the question 
of where the line is drawn between a poor member of a category 
and an object that is not a member of the category. For example, it is 
conceivable that a chair could be built with no seat. This imagined 
piece of furniture has 4 legs, a back, and maybe even arms, just no 
seat. Would this object be a member of chair? Maybe-if it had suf-
ficient membership qualities to fall within the gradient of chair. 
However, it would certainly not be a very good member and may 
not have enough in common with the category schema to even be 
included in chair. One idea that protects against the absurd result of 
including a chair with no seat in the category is that the properties 
of the schema that are most tied to the human experience and inte-
raction with the object are given greater weight. 109 Thus, our expe-
riences with chairs would lead us to assign much more value to 
having a seat (something to sit on) than to the other criteria. The 
seat-less chair would likely fall below the threshold criteria for 
membership. 
Categories with fuzzy boundaries, defined by non-binary crite-
ria, are helpful to understand how we acquire language and use it 
to assimilate and interact with the world around us. The develop-
ment of prototype semantics provided great insight into how 
people think about language. The question, then, is how prototype 
semantics might afford the same insight in the patent law world. 
109 See Janda, supra note 11, at 16. 
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS 
The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. 
-- Ludwig Wittgenstein 110 
341 
It is astonishing is how little patent law draws from the linguis-
tics field, despite the frequent searching by commentators and 
courts for alternative approaches. The analogies between patent law 
and cognitive linguistics are remarkable. Prototype semantics, and 
particularly the aspect of non-binary categorization, are advanta-
geous for looking at the doctrine of equivalents, a doctrine specifi-
cally designed to create a fuzzy boundary around the fences created 
by claim construction. 
This section discusses two main observations and a conclusion. 
First, the process of claim construction, or the search for meaning of 
claim terms, is inconsistent with how we acquire and understand 
language. The results are definitions that are thorny to work with. 
Second, these imperfect claim constructions are then used as neces-
sary and sufficient conditions to determine infringement; but when 
dealing with language, it is difficult to make determinations based 
on definitional, or binary, criteria. The result of these shortcomings 
is a flawed infringement analysis. Rather than dealing with this, the 
courts created the doctrine of equivalents to compensate. 
If the doctrine of equivalents is dead, as has been reported, does 
that mean that the problems of language no longer exist in in-
fringement analysis? My conclusion is no; rather, courts have begun 
sub silentio to deal with the imperfections in claim construction and 
infringement analysis that was previously addressed by the doc-
trine. Because a more natural way to interpret and apply language 
is through fuzzy categorization, it makes sense that the artificial 
110 LUDWIG WITIGENSfEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS § 5.6 (C.K. Ogden 
trans., 1922), available at http:/ /www.gutenberg.org/files/5740/5740-pdf.pdf. 
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leeway that had been accomplished by the doctrine of equivalents 
actually occurs elsewhere-namely in more instinctive claim con-
structions and infringement comparisons. In other words, the doc-
trine of equivalents is not truly dead. 
A. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION VERSUS Fuzzy CATEGORIZATION 
The first step of infringement analysis is always claim construc-
tion. 111 Claim construction, or defining the words that delineate the 
patentee's exclusive territory, is implicated in the doctrine of equi-
valents because one of the justifications for the doctrine is the diffi-
culty of capturing inventions in words. 112 I assert that part of this 
difficulty is due to the fact that the process of claim construction 
clashes with how we generally acquire and understand language. In 
part because it is unnatural to think about words in definitional 
terms and in part because the claim interpretations will be subse-
quently used to determine infringement, the process of claim con-
struction should be less about finding definitional meaning and 
more about building new connections with existing categories. Two 
aspects of current claim construction practice are particularly in-
compatible: first, claim terms are to be construed in a vacuum, and 
second, a judge's personal understanding of claim terms is not rele-
vant. Both of these rules conflict with how language is generally 
understood and have lead to claim constructions requiring flexibili-
ty at application. 
The existing claim construction mantra is as follows. Claims are 
to be given their "ordinary and customary meaning" that would be 
m See, e.g., Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 483 F.3d 800, 804 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
112 See supra Section I.B; Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 
535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002) ("The language in the patent claims may not capture every nuance 
of the invention or describe with complete precision the range of its novelty."). 
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given to them by someone of ordinary skill in the relevant art. 113 To 
determine the ordinary and customary meaning, the courts look at 
intrinsic evidence, including the claim itself, the specification, and 
the record of communication between the patentee and the Patent 
Office created during patent acquisition, known as the prosecution 
history. 114 Courts may also consider extrinsic evidence, such as dic-
tionaries, treatises, and expert testimony, but this evidence is consi-
dered less reliable than the intrinsic evidence. 115 
First, because claims are to be construed in light of the intrinsic 
evidence, the implication is that the accused device is not to be con-
sidered. 116 In any case, the accused device has no bearing on how a 
person of skill in the art would interpret the claim terms. 117 The 
Federal Circuit has allowed that courts should focus on the aspects 
of the accused device that are in dispute, but does not permit the 
court to construe claims by making a side-by-side comparison. 118 
While this rule helps in preventing the judge from deciding the in-
113 See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en 
bane). 
114 See id. at 1314. 
m See id. at 1317-19. 
116 See, e.g., SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
("A claim is construed in the light of the claim language, the other claims, the prior 
art, the prosecution history, and the specification, not in light of the accused device.") 
(emphasis in original). 
117 See Peter S. Menell et a!., Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and 
Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 816 (2010). 
118 See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Brads by Co., 442 F.3d 1322, 1326-
27 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Pall Corp. v. Hemasure Inc., 181 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
("Although the construction of the claim is independent of the device charged with 
infringement, it is convenient for the court to concentrate on those aspects of the 
claim whose relation to the accused device is in dispute."); Scripps Clinic & Research 
Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Of course the partic-
ular accused product (or process) is kept in mind, for it is efficient to focus on the 
construction of only the disputed elements or limitations of the claims."), overruled by 
Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282,1291 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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fringement case via the claim construction, 119 it causes claim con-
struction look more like learning a second language than under-
standing a first language. 
Recall that language acquisition and understanding comes from 
categorization and, perhaps more importantly for understanding, 
the creation of relationships or connections between categories. 120 
But if we are simply mapping one word to another, such as map-
ping the Spanish word perro to dog, then the only connection made 
is that one word equals another. Defining terms in a patent based 
on the words in the specification or the words in a dictionary is very 
similar. What is missing are the connections between the basic level 
word (or, perhaps in patent law, the claim term at issue) and any 
superordinates and subordinates that may elaborate on meaning. 
With the foreign language example, simply mapping perro to dog 
may eliminate making a connection that a perro is one type of animal 
or that a caniche is a particular type of perro. 121 Also missing are 
connections between the basic level word and words in the same 
category that have a different sense. For example, knowing that the 
Spanish word silla means chair does not provide the related connec-
tions that a recliner (reclinable) is a fairly good chair but a log (tronco 
de madera) is a very poor chair. 
To make claim construction more akin to language acquisition 
and understanding, a judge would need to interact with the inven-
tion and/ or the accused device to permit him to create his own cat-
119 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996). But see 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane) 
(Mayer, ]., concurring) ("To decide what the claims mean is nearly always to decide 
the case."), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
120 See supra Section II. 
121 The English word animal translates to the Spanish word animal and the term 
poodle translates to caniclze. Animal and Poodle Translaitons, LAROUSSE ONLINE 
ENGLISH-SPANISH DICfiONARY, http:// www.larousse.com/ en/ dictionaries/ english-
spanish (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (searched for "animal" and "poodle"). 
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egories and connections. Although abolished over 130 years ago, an 
early Patent Act required the inventor to submit a working model 
of the invention to the Patent Office as part of the patent acquisition 
process. 122 There are significant upsides and downsides to requiring 
the patentee to submit a working model, including the fact that not 
all patentees reduce their inventions to practice. 123 However, in the 
midst of an infringement trial, it is pretty clear that at least the al-
leged infringer has an actual device or process that the judge could 
encounter. This, too, has the downside of potentially affecting the 
judge's claim construction in favor or against infringement, but the 
advantage would be that the claim construction rendered could 
reflect the categorizations and connections that the judge made 
based on his encounter with the technology. 
Second, meaning is typically tied to the categories and connec-
tions that have been made based on past experiences. Even though 
the words being considered are public, we necessarily think about 
and consider them differently, based on personal previous encoun-
ters.124 Judges were given the task of construing patent claims, in 
part because of their expertise, 125 including the categories and con-
nections they personally created. This confidence should signal that 
judges' past experiences should play a role in claim construction. 
However, in the face of frequent criticism and appellate reversal, 
judges have expressed anxiety about this supposed competence. 126 
Further, the Federal Circuit has impliedly rejected the use of a 
122 See Kendall J. Dood, Patent Models and the Patent Law: 1790-1880 (Part I), 65 J. 
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 187,190, 217 (1983). 
123 See generally Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 
HAsTINGS L.J. 65 (2009) (describing the costs and benefits of an early filing system, 
which does not require a working model). 
124 See, e.g., Edward S. Adams & Torben Spaak, Fuzzifying the Natural Law- Legal 
Positivist Debate, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 85,95 (1995). 
125 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-89 (1996). 
126 See Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 81 (2010). 
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judge's own categorizations and connection, stating that if the judge 
knows what a particular term means, then the court might look to a 
dictionary to define the term. 127 In doing so, the courts ignore a vast 
resource, the judges' own categories and connections, which could 
offer enhanced claim constructions. In turn, richer claim construc-
tions may alleviate the need for the doctrine of equivalents as a 
hedge against the inability to express inventions in language. 
B. FUZZY SET MEMBERSHIP 
After claim construction, infringement analysis proceeds by 
comparing the accused device or process to the claims as con-
strued.128 Literal infringement is found if the device or process falls 
squarely within the territory delineated by the claims. 129 Another 
justification for the doctrine of equivalents is to prevent unfairness 
if a portion of the accused infringer's device or process falls slightly 
on the outside of the claimed territory. 130 I contend that this too 
clashes with how we think. Again we are forcing a definitional 
framework in an area where it is more natural to think in fuzzy cat-
egories and sets. This too creates a system that requires the doctrine 
of equivalents' flexibility. 
127 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("In some cases, 
the ordinary meaning of claim language ... may be readily apparent even to lay 
judges, and claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application 
of the widely ac~epted meaning of commonly understood words. In such circums-
tances, general purpose dictionaries may be helpful." (internal citations omitted)). 
128 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(en bane), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
129 See, e.g., Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Mayne Pharma (USA), Inc., 467 F.3d 1370, 
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
130 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chern. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997); 
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,733 (2002). 
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Literal infringement requires that "every limitation set forth in 
a claim must be found in an accused product, exactly." 131 If any li-
mitation is missing from the accused device or process, there is no 
literal infringement. 132 To frame this slightly differently, to infringe 
is to be a member of set claim. Membership in claim is binary-
either you infringe or you do not- and the criteria of membership 
are also assessed in binary fashion. Some case law even evokes the 
"necessary and sufficient" criteria of traditional, or definitional, set 
theory, stating that "each and every claim limitation" must be 
found in the accused device or process. 133 
Prototype semantics explains that we do not deal with words 
and concepts in a binary way.134 Faced with a construed claim and 
an accused device or process, the judge must execute precisely the 
same mental task that we all perform upon encountering something 
new- determining whether the new object fits within one or more 
categories that exist, how well it fits within any given category, and 
how it is connected to other items in that and other categories. But 
the analysis for literal infringement does not pennit this: either the 
accused device or process has element x, as construed, or it does 
not. The judge is not permitted to conclude that the accused device 
or process includes x', which is a really close match to x but is not x. 
In order to infringe, or fall within claim, only objects including x are 
considered. 
131 Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Of 
course, another requirement of infringement is that the alleged infringer must not 
have the authorization of the patentee to practice the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) 
(2006) ("[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, [imports,] offers to sell or sells 
any patented invention ... during the term of the patent ... infringes the patent."). 
132 See Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (citing TIP Sys., LLC v. Phillips & Brooks/Gladwin, Inc., 529 F.3d 1364, 1379 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
133 See, e.g., Abraxis Bioscience, 467 F.3d at 1378. 
134 See supra Section II-A. 
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Returning to the simplistic chair example, the definitional crite-
ria for chair include a seat, 4 legs, a back, and the connection be-
tween the seat and the back, as well as the connection between the 
seat and the legs. Literal infringement, like traditional set theory, 
requires accused device to include each of these elements exactly. 
An object that includes a seat, 4 legs, a back, and the given connec-
tions is a member of set chair and, for patent law purposes, a mem-
ber of set claim and thus infringing. Consider now a chair that has a 
seat, 3 legs, a back, and the given connections- basically a 3-legged 
chair. If a houseguest were to ask for a chair, you would not hesitate 
to give them the 3-legged chair. But, because the 3-legged chair 
does not include each and every element of chair, and therefore 
claim, it does not infringe. It is not possible to meet the criterion of 
"4legs" pretty well-the criteria are binary. It is not possible to be a 
very good member of claim-infringement too is binary. Given 
how we naturally think, to determine a 3-legged chair is not a chair 
seems wrong, particularly since the element "4 legs" may itself be 
the less-than-perfect construction of the claim term, as discussed 
above. 
C. WHAT REALLY HAPPENED TO THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS 
Based on the above discussion, it would appear that the doc-
trine of equivalents is exactly what is needed to handle some of the 
problems of language in patent law, both the crafting claims to cov-
er the invention and the determination whether an accused device 
or process falls within the delineated territory. 
Language has not gotten any less complicated nor has claim 
construction or infringement analysis improved. The justifications 
for the doctrine of equivalents remain as apt today as they were at 
the doctrine's creation. How then do we explain the evidence that 
the doctrine of equivalents is on the wane? I contend that the doc-
trine of equivalents is appearing less frequently in patent infringe-
ment cases because courts are starting to handle patent cases in a 
more natural manner, allowing fuzziness to be introduced during 
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the claim construction or literal infringement determinations, rather 
than as an afterthought that requires a special doctrine. 
For an example of how this might work, consider again the cat-
egory bird. If there was a claim covering bird, it might include the 
following elements: an animal having a body with wings, feathers, 
and a beak, as well as progeny that hatch from eggs and have the 
ability to fly. 135 These criteria create the fence, inside of which in-
fringement is found. A robin has a body with wings, feathers, and a 
beak, hatched offspring, and can fly. And further, a robin meets 
each of these criteria very well. The robin then infringes bird. More 
often than the robin, however, the judge is presented with an ac-
cused device or process that is more akin to the penguin. The pen-
guin meets the criteria of a body having wings and a beak very 
well. It easily meets the criteria of having progeny that hatches from 
eggs. But the judge is left with the penguin that has unusual feath-
ers and cannot really fly. How does the judge analyze whether the 
penguin infringes bird? 
One thing a judge can do is interpret the term "feather" in a 
fuzzy manner that includes more than just the type of downy feath-
er typically thought of. The categories and connections in the 
judge's mind permit him to recognize that the term "feather" is not 
so limited. With this in mind, he can fairly consider that the pen-
guin meets the criterion of a body having feathers. 
Another thing he can do is apply the criterion of flight in a 
fuzzy way. A robin, as the prototypical member of bird, exhibits a 
very good ability to fly. Compared to the robin, the penguin's abili-
ty to fly is very poor. But say the penguin can propel itself with his 
wings a bit. The bird may not be doing what we consider flying, but 
he is showing some signs of flight. In definitional set theory, astra-
135 This claim is not realistic, but does provide an illustration of the issue. A real 
life application of the theory is discussed below. 
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ditional infringement analysis is considered, there is no gradient of 
meeting the criteria-either it is or is not met. The penguin's level of 
flight is too low to meet the threshold, and so the criterion is not 
met. However fuzzy membership allows values in between met and 
not met. If the penguin satisfies the other criteria well or very well, 
and satisfies the flight criterion enough, then the penguin can still 
be found to be a member of bird. The penguin is just not as good a 
member. 
When talking about patent infringement, this level of fluidity is 
not acceptable, because it can be over-inclusive. For example, it is 
possible that a platypus could be considered a very bad member of 
bird, based on the fact is has a beak and lays eggs, even though it is 
a mammal. To avoid an undue amount of "false positives," the 
judge can assign varying weights to the elements. For example, he 
may determine that it is very important for a bird to lay eggs and 
have feathers and wings, less important for a bird to have a beak, 
and not terribly important to be able to fly. Again, our prototypical 
bird, the robin, meets all the criteria well. A penguin meets the 
most important criteria, or at least fairly well depending on how the 
judge defines the term feather. The penguin also satisfies the less 
important criterion of having a beak. The penguin cannot fly, so he 
satisfies that element to a lesser degree. But all in all, the penguin 
meets a sufficient number of criteria to a reasonable degree of satis-
faction, so the penguin is a member of bird. The platypus, however, 
would not meet enough of the criteria; in particular, the platypus 
does not meet two of the three key elements (having feathers and 
wings). Finally, the ultimate determination of infringement may not 
be binary. As long as the accused device or process, in this case the 
penguin, meets a threshold level of a combination of the criteria, it 
infringes. In the end, a penguin is still a bird. 
Empirical or descriptive studies of patent opinions are unlikely 
to observe this shift from strict set theory to fuzzy infringement 
analysis because it is doubtful that a court would explain it was us-
ing intuitive prototype semantics instead of the doctrine. Why 
would a judge mention that he read a claim and understood it the 
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same way he read a newspaper and understood it? Because there is 
no named doctrine to hang upon it, the act of defining and applying 
claim language in a natural way would easily go unnoticed. 
Of course, for the same reasons that it would be generally over-
looked, it is difficult to point to clear evidence that demonstrates 
that this is indeed the case. There are, however, some data that sup-
port these contentions. First, judges are likely to be using prototype 
semantics in patent cases. In addition to the fact that it is a natural 
human reaction to language and thinking, judges who are uncom-
fortable with the claim construction process may resort to what 
seems effortless. Alternatively, judges who have had or fear having 
their claim construction rulings overturned on appeal have no in-
centive to do any sort of interpretation that goes beyond their intui-
tive means. Second, in dealing with the same problems that lead to 
the creation of the doctrine of equivalents in the United States, other 
countries have chosen approaches that look much more like cogni-
tive linguistics. Third, there are small indications beginning to ap-
pear in case law that suggest that prototype semantics may be at 
work. 
First, it is fair to assume that judges are using fuzzy categoriza-
tion and prototype semantics. Judges, being human, would use the 
same system of categories and connections to think about their en-
counters with the world. It is unlikely that they can turn off this 
thinking when they are on the bench. And, even if they could, there 
are at least two reasons why they may choose not to. On one hand, 
some judges do not like patent cases and hope to get these cases off 
their dockets as quickly as possible. 136 On the other hand, there are 
136 See A Panel Discussion: Claim Construction from the Perspective of the District 
Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 682 (2004); Janice M. Mueller, Crafting Patents for 
the Twenty-First Century: Maximize Patent Strength and Avoid Prosecution History Estop-
pel in a Post-Markman/Hilton Davis World, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 499, 
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many judges who do make an effort to follow the Federal Circuit's 
claim construction jurisprudence, but they are frequently overruled 
on appeal, so much so that a number of these judges have spoken 
up. 137 The natural reaction, in either case, would be to follow the 
path of least resistance and perform claim construction and in-
fringement determinations using ingrained prototype semantic-
type analysis. 
Second, although United States patent law is not completely in 
harmony with international patent laws, it is instructive to see how 
others handle the same problem. One useful example, known as 
"purposive construction," comes from the United Kingdom. 138 
When construing the patent claims, the court is to ask whether a 
person of skill in the art would understand that a particular term 
required strict compliance, even should it not make much differ-
ence in the function. 139 This is consistent with fuzzy membership, 
503 (1997); Edited & Excerpted Transcript of the Symposium on Ideas Into Action: Imple-
menting Reform of the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1053, 1108-09 (2004). 
137 See, e.g., Judge James F. Holderman with Halley Guren, The Patent Litigation 
Predicament in the United States, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 1, 6 ("As a result of the 
de novo standard of appellate review applied to our claim construction determina-
tions, we United States district court judges feel like the late comedian Rodney Dan-
gerfield because our opinions 'get no respect."'); Victoria Slind-Flor, The Markman 
Prophecies, IP WORLDWIDE, Mar. 13, 2002, at 28, 30 (quoting Judge Samuel Kent as 
saying that, on the issue of claim construction, the Federal Circuit is full of "little 
green men who don't know Tuesday from Philadelphia" and that he does not get 
excited when ending a patent case because "[the case] goes to the Federal Circuit 
afterwards[, where] it's hard to deal with things that are ultimately resolved by 
people wearing propeller hats."), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticlcFricndly.jsp?id=900005528997. 
138 See, e.g., Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd., [1982] R.P.C. 183, 243 
(H.L.). 
139 !d. 
A patent specification should be given a purposive construction rather 
than a purely literal one derived from applying to it the kind of meticulous 
verbal analysis in which lawyers are too often tempted by their training to 
indulge. The question in each case is: whether persons with practical 
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because some elements of the claims may carry a higher weight, 
and thus require strict compliance, while others do not. Using the 
bird example, the element of progeny hatching from eggs may re-
quire strict compliance-if it does not lay an egg from which a baby 
hatches, it is not a member of bird. This element cannot be deviated 
from. But other elements, such as feathers and flying may carry less 
weight and not require strict compliance. 
Finally, court opinions are starting to indicate a movement to-
ward prototype semantics and fuzzy infringement. For example, 
consider the case International Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp. 140 In this 
case, the patent was for a semiconductor device having, among oth-
er elements, a "polygonal region." 141 One of the issues disputed at 
trial was the meaning of that element. The district court, perhaps 
reflecting fuzzy categorization, interpreted that the "polygonal re-
knowledge and experience of the kind of work in which the invention was 
intended to be used, would understand that strict compliance with a par-
ticular descriptive word or phrase appearing in a claim was intended by 
the patentee to be an essential requirement of the invention so that any va-
riant would fall outside the monopoly claimed, even though it could have 
no material effect upon the way the invention worked. 
140 lnt'l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
141 See High Power Mosfet with Low On-Resistance and High Breakdown Voltage, 
U.S. Patent No. 4,959,699 (filed June 22, 1989). Claim 1 of the '699 Patent recites, in 
relevant part: 
A high power metal oxide silicon field effect transistor device exhibiting 
relatively low on-resistance and relatively high breakdown voltage; said 
device comprising: a wafer of semiconductor material having first and 
second opposing semiconductor surfaces; said wafer of semiconductor 
material having a relatively lightly doped major body portion for receiving 
junctions and being doped with impurities of one conductivity type; at 
least first and second spaced base regions of the opposite conductivity 
type to said one conductivity type ... first and second source regions of 
said one conductivity type ... 
at least said first base region being a cellular polygonal region; said cellu-
lar polygonal region being surrounded by said common conduction re-
gion; said first source region having the shape of an annular ring disposed 
within said cellular polygonal first base region. 
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gion" would "be generally but not perfectly polygonal- i.e., the 
surface expression of the base will be a closed figure with generally 
(not necessarily perfectly) straight sides." 142 The district court also 
noted that the corners may be rounded, not precisely angular. 143 
This looks a lot like a fuzzy category of polygonal, where there ex-
ists a bit of leeway around the traditionally defined mathematical 
polygon. A perfect polygon with straight sides and angular corners 
would be a very good, or even prototypical, polygon. A shape with 
blurred sides and rounded corners would be a lesser polygon, but 
may still fit squarely in the category of polygon. The Federal Cir-
cuit, however, took a traditional set theory stance, noting that a po-
lygon must be defined as "a closed plane figure bounded by 
straight lines." 144 
The need for the doctrine of equivalents has not lessened, so it 
makes sense that the problems that give rise to the doctrine are be-
ing addressed elsewhere in the patent infringement analysis. It also 
makes sense that the movement is in the direction of natural beha-
vior-how we normally think and understand language. As judges 
resort less to the doctrine of equivalents and more to prototype se-
mantics and fuzzy categorization, more instances of this type of 
analysis are likely to become more visible. 
D. ADAPTING PATENT LAW TO FIT Fuzzy INFRINGEMENT 
If the use of the doctrine of equivalents is waning because 
judges are beginning to use prototype semantics and fuzzy catego-
rization to handle the problems the doctrine was created for, then 
patent law too needs to adjust. In addition to abolishing the doc-
trine of equivalents as a doctrine, there are at least two other 
142 See lnt'I Rectifier, 361 F.3d at 1370. 
143 See id. 
144 See id. at 1371-72. 
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changes that would aid in making fuzzy infringement analysis 
work: first, honor the categories and connections made by the dis-
trict court by changing the standard of review for claim construc-
tion, and second, remove the prohibition on using working exam-
ples and accused devices for claim construction purposes. 
The present standard of review for claim construction determi-
nations is de novo. 145 Since its inception, various constituents have 
argued that de novo review is inappropriate for a number of rea-
sons.146 Regardless of the persuasiveness of other reasons to change 
the standard of review, if claim construction is taking into account 
the categories and categorizations existing in the district court 
judge's mind, then these inputs have to be available for appellate 
review. Fortunately, the winds of change seem to be blowing in the 
Federal Circuit on this issue; even absent the argument that factual 
review of a district court judge's categorizations and connections, it 
is likely that claim construction determinations will soon be af-
forded a more deferential review. 147 
145 See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en 
bane). 
146 One of the more vocal jurists calling for deferential review is Judge H. Robert 
Mayer of the Federal Circuit. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (Mayer, J., dissenting) ("Now more than ever I am convinced of the 
futility, indeed the absurdity, of this court's persistence in adhering to the falsehood 
that claim construction is a matter of law devoid of any factual component."). 
For examples from academic literature, see Thomas Chen, Note, Patent Claim Con-
struction: An Appeal for Chevron Deference, 94 VA. L. REV. 1165 (2008); Jeffrey Peabody, 
Under Construction: Towards a More Deferential Standard of Review in Claim Construction 
Cases, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 505 (2008); M. Reed Staheli, Comment, Deseroed Deference: 
Reconsidering the De Novo Standard of Review for Claim Construction, 3 MARQ. INTELL. 
PROP. L. REv.181 (1999). 
147 See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1041 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) (Michel, C.J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en bane) ("' 
believe the time has come for us to re-examine Cybor's no deference rule."); id. at 
1043 (Newman, J., dissenting from same); id. at 1044 (Rader, J., dissenting from 
same); id. at 1045 Goint opinion of Gajarsa, Linn & Dyk, JJ., concurring in denial of 
petition for rehearing en bane) (noting that a different case would provide a better 
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Changing patent law rules to allow for, or even encourage, in-
troduction of working models and the accused device or process 
during claim construction does not have as much underlying sup-
port. However, even this proposal has been suggested to address 
other problems and is therefore not an impossible impediment to 
moving towards a system that acknowledges the prototype seman-
tics and fuzzy categorization described herein. For example, there 
have been calls requiring a patentee to have built a prototype in 
order to obtain a patent. 148 I am not suggesting that a working 
model would be required, simply that claim construction and in-
fringement analysis would be better served by lifting the prohibi-
tion on considering information that would be helpful for the judge 
to understand the invention. 
There may be other changes to current patent infringement 
analysis that would also allow the court to make use of intuitive 
mental processes, such as fuzzy categories and connections. The key 
is to embrace prototype semantics as a better method for determin-
ing patent infringement, rather than celebrate the death of the doc-
trine of equivalents. 
vehicle to reconsider deferential review of claim constructions); id. at 1046 (Moore, J., 
dissenting from same). 
148 See, e.g., Sean B. Seymore, 77w Teaclzing Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 621, 642-43 (2010) (calling for a patent examiner to request a working model if 
the patent application's written description may be inadequate); Ted Sichelman, 
Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 392-93 (2010) (noting that requiring a 
working model may increase commercialization but would be less than ideal); Co-
tropia supra note 123, at 120-22 (suggesting that the requirement of a working model 
would discourage premature patent filing). 
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CONCLUSION 
A man who shouts "Your house is on fire" may not be able to define 
exactly what he means by your and house and is and on and fire, but he 
might still be saying something quite important. 
-- J.B. Priestly 149 
Much ink has been spilled announcing the death of the doctrine 
of equivalents, more often in wishing good riddance to the doctrine 
rather than eulogizing the long-lived practice. These articles are 
focused on the wrong aspect, however. The doctrine was created for 
very sensible reasons; the problems language causes for drafting 
patent claims and determining infringement have not disappeared. 
But in their rush to cheer the doctrine's demise, most scholars have 
not looked at what has stepped into its place. 
This Article suggests that the doctrine of equivalents is dead in 
name only. Patent infringement cases are still plagued by the diffi-
culty of using words to create fences around a patentee's exclusive 
territory. And there is still the concern that an infringer may avoid 
liability if his accused device or process is just barely outside the 
defined fence. Rather than addressing these issues by performing a 
formulaic infringement analysis and then using the artificial doc-
trine of equivalents to create flexibility, now these problems are be-
ing tackled at their root-the language itself. Cognitive linguistics, 
and specifically prototype semantics, explains how we naturally 
acquire, understand, and think about language. It is a simple step to 
see how claim construction and infringement analysis are reflec-
tions of fuzzy categorization and non-binary membership sets. 
Viewing infringement analysis through a fuzzy lens not only makes 
sense, but also puts the judge in a position of doing what comes 
149 E.g., Gardner, supra note 87, at 51. 
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naturally. We regularly interact with our world in terms of catego-
ries and connections. It should not be surprising that the same anal-
ysis is occurring in patent infringement cases. The doctrine of equi-
valents will not truly die, because a penguin will still be a bird. 
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